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Abstract
Recent work has documented the susceptibility
of deep learning systems to adversarial examples,
but most such attacks directly manipulate the dig-
ital input to a classifier. Although a smaller line
of work considers physical adversarial attacks, in
all cases these involve manipulating the object of
interest, e.g., putting a physical sticker on an ob-
ject to misclassify it, or manufacturing an object
specifically intended to be misclassified. In this
work, we consider an alternative question: is it
possible to fool deep classifiers, over all perceived
objects of a certain type, by physically manipulat-
ing the camera itself? We show that by placing
a carefully crafted and mainly-translucent sticker
over the lens of a camera, one can create univer-
sal perturbations of the observed images that are
inconspicuous, yet misclassify target objects as a
different (targeted) class. To accomplish this, we
propose an iterative procedure for both updating
the attack perturbation (to make it adversarial for
a given classifier), and the threat model itself (to
ensure it is physically realizable). For example,
we show that we can achieve physically-realizable
attacks that fool ImageNet classifiers in a targeted
fashion 49.6% of the time. This presents a new
class of physically-realizable threat models to con-
sider in the context of adversarially robust ma-
chine learning. Our demo video can be viewed at:
https://youtu.be/wUVmL33Fx54
1. Introduction
Many recent papers have established that deep learning
classifiers are particularly susceptible to adversarial attacks,
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Figure 1. Illustration of our approach: (left) our adversarial sticker
affixed to a camera lens; (right) view from the camera with sticker,
where the keyboard is reliably classified as a computer mouse for
most viewpoints and scales.
manipulations of the input to a classifier specifically crafted
to be largely unobservable to humans, but which cause
the classifier to predict incorrectly (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2015). These perturbations be crafted to
be bounded by various Lp norms (Su et al., 2019; Carlini
& Wagner, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). In the
majority of the cases studied, however, these attacks are
considered in a “purely digital” domain, that is they consider
perturbations that directly modify the digital input to the
classifier in order to fool the model. A smaller but still
substantial line of work has emerged to show that these
attacks can also transfer to the physical world: these have
considered cases of printing out pictures intended to fool
classifiers (Brown et al., 2017), placing physical stickers on
objects to fool a classifier (Evtimov et al., 2018), or directly
manufacturing objects intended to fool a classifier (even
when observed from multiple angles) (Athalye et al., 2017).
In all these cases, though, the primary mode of attack has
been manipulating the object of interest, often with very
visually apparent perturbations. Compared to attacks in the
digital space, physical attacks have not been explored to its
full extent: we still lack baselines and feasible threat models
that work robustly in reality.
In this work, we propose a method for physically fooling a
network such that all objects of a particular class are mis-
classified using a visually inconspicuous modification. To
accomplish this, we develop an adversarial camera sticker,
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which can be affixed to the lens of the camera itself, and
which contains a carefully constructed pattern of dots that
causes images viewed by the camera to be misclassified.
These dots look like mostly-imperceptible blurry spots in
the camera image, and are not obvious to someone viewing
the image, as is examplified in Figure 1. The main challenge
of creating this attack relative to past work is that the space
of possible perturbations we can feasibly introduce with this
model is very limited: unlike past attacks which operate in
the pixel-level granularity of the images, the optics of the
camera mean that we can only create blurry dots without
any of the high frequency patterns typical of most adver-
sarial attacks. The overall procedure consists of three main
contributions and improvements over past work:
1. Our threat model is the first of its kind to inject a
perturbation on the optical path between the camera
and the object, without tampering the object itself.
2. Ours is the first instance we are aware of a “universal”
physical perturbation (universal perturbations in digi-
tal space were considered by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
(2017)). Owing to the fact that the sticker will apply
the same perturbation to all images, we need to create
a single perturbation that will cause the classifier to
misclassify over multiple angles and scales.
3. Our method jointly optimizes the adversarial nature of
the attack while fitting the threat model to the pertur-
bations achievable by the camera. This is due to the
challenge in finding the “allowable” set of perturba-
tions that can be physically observed by the camera.
We carefully crafted our dot attacks and the visual threat
model (i.e., the set of allowable physical perturbations)
using a differentiable alpha blending module (will be ex-
plained in Section 3.1). We train the attack, and conducted
evaluation experiments, both on a real camera using printed
stickers, and (virtually, but with physically realistic pertur-
bations) on the ImageNet dataset (Deng et al., 2009). Our
experiments show that on real video data with a physically
manufactured sticker, we can achieve an average targeted
fooling rate of 52% over 5 different class / target class
combinations, and furthermore reduce the accuracy of the
classifier to 27%. On the ImageNet test set, we can construct
a (digital, but physically realistic) attack that reduces the
classification accuracy of the “street sign” ImageNet class
from 64% to 18%, and achieves a average of a 33% targeted
fooling rate over 50 randomly selected target classes. In
total, we believe this work substantially adds to the recent
crucial considerations of the “right” notion of adversarial
threat models (see e.g. Papernot et al. (2018) for additional
discussion on a similar point), demonstrating that these pose
physical risk when an attacker can access a camera.
2. Background and Related Works
This paper will focus on the so-called white-box attack
setting, where we assume access to the model. In this setting,
past work can be roughly categorized into two relevant
groups for our work: digital attacks and physical attacks.
2.1. Digital Attacks
Digital attacks have been relatively well studied since they
first rose to prevalence in the context of deep learning in
2014, where Szegedy et al. (2013) used the box-constrained
L-BFGS method to find the perturbation. Goodfellow et al.
(2015) later introduced a simple attack called FGSM which
applied perturbation to the direction in image space which
yields the highest increase of the linearized cost under L∞
norm. Kurakin et al. (2016) proposed a iterative multi-step
version of this approach, further elaborated upon and studied
by Madry et al. (2017) as an L∞ projected gradient descent
method. These approaches, and variants such as those stud-
ied independently by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) (which
considers L2 norm attacks), comprise the current state of
the art in digital attacks.
2.2. Physical Attacks
Compared with digital attacks, physically realizable attacks
have not been explored to a full extent beyond a few ex-
isting works. Kurakin et al. (2016) was the first to show
the existence of attacks in real world. Soon afterwards, Lu
et al. (2017a) empirically claimed that such attacks were
not easily realized under realistic transformations, though
Athalye et al. (2017) and Evtimov et al. (2018) soon after
demonstrated robust attacks which worked in real world set-
ting. Evtimov et al. (2018) showed it was possible to modify
a stop sign with stickers such that a classifier would classify
it as a speed limit sign. However, Lu et al. (2017b) demon-
strated that the state-of-the-art detectors are currently not
fooled by the attacks introduced by Evtimov et al. (2018).
Often, what works in digital space cannot be generalized to
physical space (Zeng et al., 2017).
Meanwhile, another stream of the works created actual phys-
ical objects as attacks. Brown et al. (2017) created an adver-
sarial patch, a small piece of paper that can be placed next
to objects to render them all classified as a toaster; Atha-
lye et al. (2017) manufactured a 3D-printed turtle that is
misclassified as rifle or jigsaw puzzle. However, both these
attacks may be hard to deploy in some settings because 1)
they require that each object of interest for where we want
to fool the classifier be explicitly modified; and 2) they are
visually apparent to humans when inspecting the object.
In contrast to the existing methods of physical attacks, our
proposed dotted sticker does not require direct tampering
of the object of the interest, and it is inconspicuous to the
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camera viewer. Indeed, it is almost unnoticeable to people
looking at the image, unless they specifically know what to
look for, as is shown on the left side of Figure 1.
3. Crafting Adversarial Stickers
This section contains the main methodological contribution
of our paper: the algorithmic and practical pipeline for
manufacturing adversarial camera sticker. To begin, we will
first describe the general threat model (perturbation model)
we consider in this work; unlike past works which often
considered Lp norm bounded perturbations, we require a
threat model that can naturally capture the perturbations
seen by a camera. We describe our approach to fit this
perturbation model to observed data (i.e., so that the threat
model captures what is actually seen in a given camera), and
finally how we adjust the free parameters of our attack to
craft adversarial examples.
3.1. A threat model for physical camera sticker attacks
Traditional attacks on neural network models work as fol-
lows. Given a classifier f : X → Y , we want to find some
perturbation function pi : X → X , such that for any input
x ∈ X , pi(x) looks “indistinguishable” from x, yet is clas-
sified incorrectly by f even when x is classified correctly,
i.e., f(x) 6= f(pi(x)). Typically pi is taken to be some
norm-bounded additive perturbation, i.e.,
pi(x) = x+ δ (1)
with ‖δ‖p ≤  for some bound  (we generally refer to the
space of all such allowable function as Π), though in this
work we will specifically consider a much more limited class
of perturbations, to ensure that they are actually achievable
in a real system.
The goal of standard adversarial attacks is, for a given x ∈
X , y ∈ Y , to find a perturbation pi ∈ Π that maximizes the
loss
max
pi∈Π
`(f(pi(x)), y). (2)
A slight variant of this approach is to consider targeted
attacks that specifically try to maximize the loss of the true
class and minimize loss of some target class
max
pi∈Π
(`(f(pi(x)), y)− `(f(pi(x), ytarg))) . (3)
Finally, whereas the standard attacks are able to adapt pi
to a specific input, another variant (which we will need
to consider here), is a universal perturbation, where a sin-
gle perturbation function pi must be chosen to maximize
expected error over multiple samples drawn from some dis-
tribution D
max
pi∈Π
E(x,y)∼D[`(f(pi(x)), y)] (4)
and where we can also consider the targeted variant as well.
To design a threat model for a physical camera attack, we
need to consider the approximate effect of placing small
dots on a sticker. Owing to the optics of the camera lense, a
small opaque dot placed upon the camera lens will create
a small translucent patch on the image itself. Assuming
sufficient lighting, such translucent overlays can be well-
approximated by an alpha-blending operation between the
original image and an appropriately sized and colored dot.
More formally, explicitly considering x to be an 2D image
with x(i, j) denoting the pixel at the (i, j) location, we
consider the perturbation function for a single dot in the
image pi0(x; θ), (where θ denotes the parameters of the
perturbation model, which we will discuss shortly), given
by
pi0(x; θ)(i, j) = (1− α(i, j)) · x(i, j) + α(i, j) · γ
α(i, j) = αmax · exp(−d(i, j)β)
d(i, j) =
(i− i(c))2 + (j − j(c))2
r2
(5)
where the parameters:
θ =
(
γ, (i(c), j(c)), r, αmax, β
)
(6)
correspond to the following aspects of the dot:
• γ ∈ [0, 1]3 – RGB color
• (i(c), j(c)) ∈ R2 – center location (pixel coordinates)
• r ∈ R+ – effective radius
• αmax ∈ [0, 1] – maximum alpha blending value
• β ∈ R+ – exponential dropoff of alpha value
Intuitively, this perturbation model captures the follow-
ing process. Each dot is parameterized by its center lo-
cation in the image (i(c), j(c)) and its color γ. Each pixel
pi0(x; θ)(i, j) in the perturbed image is given by a linear
combination between the original pixel and the color γ,
weighted by the position-dependent alpha mask α(i, j). For
pixels (i, j) that are closer than the radius r to the point, the
corresponding α(i, j) value will be close to αmax, whereas
for pixels that are far away, the α(i, j) value will be essen-
tially zero. Finally, the β parameters controls the “smooth-
ness” of the dropoff: for β →∞, the alpha mask will hard
dropoff at a radius r, whereas for smaller values the dropoff
in alpha values will be more gradual.
To form our final perturbation model, we simply compose
K of these single-dot perturbations, that is
pi(x; θ) = pi0(·; θK) ◦ . . . ◦ pi0(·; θ2) ◦ pi0(x; θ1) (7)
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Figure 2. Illustration of perturbation model: (left) original image;
(right) image perturbed (digitally) using our alpha-blending pertur-
bation. There are 8 dots in this case, note that the white dot cannot
be printed in real world.
where the total parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θK) are simply the
concatenation of the parameters for each dot. A visualiza-
tion of a possible perturbation under this model, with multi-
ple dots with different center locations and colors, αmax =
0.3, β = 1.0, and a radius of 40 pixels is shown in Figure
2. One point that is important to emphasize is that resulting
image pi(x; θ) is a differentiable function of the parameters
θ: all parameters are real-valued quantities and each pixel
value is a continuous function of the parameters. In other
words, we can implement the perturbation model within an
automatic differentiation toolkit (we implement it in the Py-
Torch library), a feature that will be exploited to both fit the
perturbation model to real data, and to construct adversarial
attacks, in the following sections.
3.2. Achieving inconspicuous, physically realizable
perturbations
Although the perturbation model above captures a reason-
able approximation to attacks that can be created by a physi-
cal sticker, there are obvious problems with simply optimiz-
ing an attack over its parameters θ. First, it is easy to create
attacks that fool a classifier, but which are very obvious to
an observer (consider a fully opaque “dot” that covers the
entire image). But second, and more subtly, most parameter-
izations in such a class will not correspond to perturbation
that can be physically achieved on the camera. Indeed, this
can be seen in Figure 2: the neon-colored dots are possible
to reproduce with a printed sticker, and the precise radius,
opacity, and smoothing dropoff of an actual physical dot are
not perfectly controllable, but are limited to a very narrow
range of achievable parameters.
Owing to this fact, instead of constructing attacks under the
general perturbation model first and then attempting to man-
ufacture them physically, we take an opposite approach: we
manufacture physical perturbations that we know to be both
inconspicuous and (by definition) physically realizable, and
we fit the parameters of the perturbation model to recreate
these physical perturbations. Ultimately, this will the give
us a class of perturbation function Π corresponding to most
of the parameters in our perturbation model being fixed (ra-
dius, opacity, dropoff, and a discrete set of allowable colors),
while only a few remain free (namely the specific choice of
color and the location of the dot).
In more details, our process works like the following. We
print a single small physical dot on transparent paper, and
collect two images of the same visual scene (with the camera
rigidly mounted so as not to move between taking the two
images), one with a clean view, referred to as x(0) and one
with the dot placed in front of the camera, referred to as
x(1); one instance of such images are shown in Figure 8.
We then used the structural similarity (SSIM) (Zhao et al.,
2017), which measures the similarity of 2 pictures, to fit
the parameters of our perturbation model to reconstruct the
observed perturbation as much as possible; that is, we solve
the optimization problem
max
θ
SSIM(pi0(x
(0); θ), x(1)) (8)
where we note that by convention, we want to maximize the
SSIM to make the images as close as possible.
In theory, because both the SSIM and the perturbation model
pi are differentiable functions, we could simply use projected
gradient descent (PGD) to optimize our perturbation model.
In reality, however, the loss landscape of this problem is
highly non-convex, and most random initializations will
have uninformative gradients. Consider the case where the
initial guess of dot location does not overlap at all with the
actual dot location: in this case, there will be no informative
gradient over the dot location (and hence no informative gra-
dients over the other dot parameters either). In practice, the
search procedure therefore requires that we find a very good
initialization for the dot location, its color, and the other pa-
rameters, and only run PGD from this initial location. The
precise details of our initialization procedure are perhaps
somewhat unimportant to the main messages of this paper,
but since the practical implementation is a key aspect to this
work overall, very briefly, we use the following strategies to
find initial points and optimize the SSIM:
• To initialize the position we simply make an informed
guess based upon the known position of the dot in each
such physically perturbed images.
• To initialize color space, we fit a linear transformation
between the RGB values on the digital version to be
printed, and the actual RGB values observed by the
camera, that is, we printed 50 separate colors to esti-
mate the transform, kR/G/B and bR/G/B are scalars.
γ
(observed)
R/G/B = kR/G/B · γ(printed)R/G/B + bR/G/B (9)
• Initial values for the remaining radius, αmax, and β val-
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ues are simply fixed to values that produce reasonable-
looking images.
• In maximizing the SSIM, we found it was advanta-
geous to employ a kind of “block coordinate descent”
to iteratively optimize over each set of parameters (cen-
ter location, color, αmax, β, and radius) individually,
each using gradient descent.
We performed this procedure for 50 different physical dots,
to learn a single set of αmax, β, and r parameters, and
50 different colors (and of course, 50 different locations,
though these parameters were only fit here in order to fit
the remaining parameters well). After fitting these parame-
ters, we restricted the allowable class of perturbations Π to
contain up to 10 composed dots, each with fixed αmax, β,
and r, and with the color gamma coming from a set of 10
possible color choices γ ∈ Γ ≡ {γ(1), . . . , γ(10)}, where
we chose the 10 colors according to how often a single dot
of this color (placed randomly) would cause a ResNet to
misclassify an example. In other words, the ultimate free
parameters of our perturbation model are 1) the center loca-
tion (i(c), j(c)) of the dot, and 2) the discrete choice of color
γ ∈ Γ; these are the parameters we subsequently optimize
over to create adversarial inputs.
3.3. Constructing adversarial examples
Given this perturbation model, our final goal is to find some
pi ∈ Π (that is, choose center locations and colors) to maxi-
mize the fooling rate of the attack. We specifically consider
building a targeted universal adversarial attack against a
single class y?, i.e., we want to fool all observed instances
of some class y? to be labelled as a target class ytarg instead.
This is formally specified by the optimization problem
max
pi∈Π
Ex∼D(x|y?) [`(f(pi(x)), y?)− `(f(pi(x)), ytarg)] .
(10)
In practice, we approximate this loss by maximizing the
loss on some subset of images for a given class. That is,
if x(1), . . . , x(M) represent a set of images for class y?, we
maximize the loss
L =
M∑
l=1
(
`(f(pi(x(l))), y?)− `(f(pi(x(l))), ytarg)
)
.
(11)
Again, because the perturbation model and loss are differen-
tiable in the parameters (i(c)k , j
(c)
k ) and γk (where the sub-
script k denotes the parameters for the kth dot), we could in
theory optimize these with pure (projected) gradient descent.
However, we here have only a discrete set of allowable color
choices γ ∈ Γ, and as before, the gradients with respect
to the dot positions present a highly non-convex loss sur-
face; and unlike in the case of fitting the perturbation model
Algorithm 1 Coordinate Descent: maximize the attack
Input: Number of dots K, True class y?, target class
ytarg, dataset x(1), . . . , x(M) of images for class y?
Output: perturbation pi ∈ Π parametarized by number
of dot centers and colors (i(c)k , j
(c)
k ) and color γk ∈ Γ for
k = 1, . . . ,K.
Initialization: (i(c)k , j
(c)
k ) := ∅ (i.e., no visible dot)
// Greedy coordinate descent
repeat
for k ∈ 1, . . . ,K do
// Test all locations and colors for this dot
for (i(c)k , j
(c)
k ), γk ∈ C × Γ do
Evaluate loss (11)
end for
Choose (i(c)k , j
(c)
k ), γk to be the parameters that
achieved the highest loss.
end for
until Loss converges
// Gradient descent fine-tuning
repeat
for k ∈ 1, . . . ,K do
Update i(c)k , j
(c)
k via gradient descent on loss (11)
end for
until Loss converges
parameters, there is no “natural” initialization for these pa-
rameters in this highly non-convex space. Owing to this,
we resort to a greedy block coordinate descent search over
individual block positions and colors. That is, we discretize
the image into a 45 x 45 grid of possible locations for a
dot center (45 is chosen such that each is 5 pixels apart for
ImageNet), which we denote C, plus the 10 discrete possible
colors. After running coordinate descent in this manner, we
finally fine-tune the position of the dots (since the colors are
discrete, we cannot fine tune these), using gradient descent
over the loss function as well. The full procedure is shown
in Algorithm 1.
4. Experiments
Here we present experiments of our attack evaluating both
the ability of the digital version of the attack to misclassify
images from the ImageNet dataset (still restricting pertur-
bations to be in our physically realizable subset), and eval-
uating the system on two real-world tasks: classifying a
computer keyboard as a computer mouse, and classifying a
stop sign as a guitar pick. We also detail some key results
in the process of fitting the threat model to real data.
Adversarial camera stickers: A physical camera-based attack on deep learning systems
Figure 3. Illustration of r = 0.025 inch dots printed on the camera
sticker from Photoshop, corresponding to r = 40pixel dots in
camera space: (left) bitmap representation of sticker; (middle)
printed sticker on transparency; (right) microscope view.
4.1. Experimental setup
All our experiments consider fooling a ResNet-50 (He
et al., 2016) classifier, pretrained using the ImageNet dataset
(Deng et al., 2009); we specifically use the pretrained model
included in the PyTorch library (Paszke et al., 2017). We
use an HP Color Laser Jet M253 to print the dot patterns
on transparency papers; both the printer and the paper are
off-the-shelf office supplies. We can print different sized
dots with radius no smaller than 0.01 inches in multiple
colors. Figure 3 shows the printing pipeline.
4.2. Training and Classification on ImageNet
To train and evaluate the system on a broad range of images,
we use the same ImageNet dataset used to train the classifier
originally. For example, to train a “computer keyboard” to
“computer mouse” attack, we optimize the parameters of
our attack perturbation, using Algorithm 1, with the 1000
images in the ImageNet dataset corresponding to computer
keyboards, and using the computer mouse class as the tar-
get class. Figure 4 shows the learned perturbations for two
instances. Note that these are still digital representations
of the perturbations, but they are constrained such that we
already know how to manufacture physical realization of
these dots, as we will show in the subsequent section; how-
ever, all results in this section will be dealing with the digital
versions.
Table 1. Performance of our 6-dot attacks on ImageNet test set.
Prediction
Class Attack Correct Target Other
Keyboard→ No 85% 0% 15%
Mouse Yes 48% 36% 16%
Street sign→ No 64% 0% 36%
Guitar Pick Yes 32% 34% 34%
Street sign→ No 64% 0% 36%
50 classes Yes 18% 33% 49%
50 Classes→ No 74% 0% 26%
50 classes Yes 42% 31% 27%
Figure 4. Perturbations (illustrated over a white background) cor-
responding to the targeted attacks found for the (left) “computer
keyboard” to “computer mouse” and (right) “street sign” to “guitar
pick” adversarial attacks. In both cases the 6-dot attacks can be
physically manufactured, these figures show a digital representa-
tion.
(a) “Street sign” (b) Perturbation (c) “Projector”
Figure 5. Physically unrealizable results generated by directly opti-
mizing digital attacks. Here, “projector” is the model’s prediction
of the perturbed image of a “street sign”.
Table 1 shows the ability of our learned perturbations (6
dots) to fool images from the ImageNet test set for these two
categories. We also showed the average success rate to fool
stop sign into 50 random classes. More generally, we also
include the averaged results for fooling 50 random classes
into other 50 random target classes. While our attacks cause
smaller increase in error compared to what is common from
traditional purely-digital attacks, we emphasize that the
allowable class of perturbation is very much smaller in
our setting. In particular, by constraining perturbations to
be both visually imperceptible and realizable by placing
a sticker on the lens, we are significantly constraining the
allowable parameter space, and further constraining it to
have relatively low-frequency components as compared to
traditional attacks. Thus, the fact that we can decrease the
accuracy so substantially with a relatively small overlay
is quite notable. Of course, the real test of the method is
the ability to transfer these attacks to the real world, as we
discuss in the next section.
Unrealizable attacks Before moving to the physical at-
tacks, we want to emphasize that the threat model we dis-
cuss, if not constrained to be physically realizable or par-
ticularly inconspicuous, can produce much higher fooling
rates; By simple running PGD on the underlying parame-
ters of the threat model within allowable range γ ∈ [0, 1]3;
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Figure 6. Sticker perturbation to fool “computer keyboard” class
to “mouse” class
(i(c), j(c)) ∈ [0, 224]2; r ∈ [1, 60]; αmax ∈ [0, 1]; β ∈ R+,
we can indeed get a strong (universal) perturbation, but one
which would still be considered “adversarial” by the context
of much past work (in that a human could still identify the
true underlying image). Figure 5 illustrates an additional in-
stances of universal perturbations in digital space that fools
“street sign” into “projector” which achieves 83% fooling
rate on the ImageNet test set. However, Figure 5b shows
an attack being overly opaque. It also requires bright col-
ors that are not possible to print and view via a transparent
sticker. Thus, the result mainly serves to emphasize that
explicitly fitting the threat model to physical data is crucial
for achieving realistic perturbations.
4.3. Evaluation of attacks in the real world
In this section we present our main empirical result of the
work, illustrating that the perturbations we produce can be
adversarial in the real world when printed and applied physi-
cally to a camera, and when viewing a target object at multi-
ple angles and scales. A video demonstrating the attack
is available at https://youtu.be/wUVmL33Fx54.
This is the first time that such an adversarial attack has
been demonstrated in the real world (that is, an attack that
modifies the camera viewing the scene instead of the object),
and it opens up a new attack vector for adversarial examples
against deep learning systems.
Specifically, using the process above, we printed the physi-
cal stickers corresponding to the two attacks mentioned in
the previous section, and affixed them to our camera. We
then recorded short videos of the camera viewing these two
physical objects at a number of different angles and scales.
In particular, for each case we created 1000 frame video of
Figure 7. Sticker perturbation to fool “street sign” class to “guitar
pick” class
the camera (with the sticker attached) viewing the target ob-
ject from multiple angles, and used our ResNet-50 classifier
to predict the class of each object.
Figure 6 and 7 shows several snapshots of the process for
both the keyboard and stop sign tests. The overlay created
by the adversarial sticker is visible in all cases, but relatively
inconspicuous, and would be unlikely to be noticed (or
more likely discarded as merely some dust on the camera)
by someone not primed to look for the particular patterns.
Table 2 shows the performance of the ResNet-50 classifier
more quantitatively for all 1000 frames of each video. In
this table, we break down the number of frames predicted
correctly (as a keyboard or street sign), the number of frames
predicted as the target class of the attack (mouse or guitar
pick respectively), and the number of frames predicted as
some other class. The inclusion of the target class here
(and the fact that the majority of images are predicted as
this class) is important: many innocuous transformations
to ImageNet-like images, such as rotations, translations, or
non-traditional cropping, can fool a classifier (Engstrom
et al., 2017; Azulay & Weiss, 2018). However, since we
are, the majority of the time, producing the target class, we
emphasize that this is not merely a manner of random noise
fooling the classifier; rather, this specific pattern of dots is
tuned precisely to produce the intended target class, and this
manifests both in the digital and physical domains.
4.4. Other experiments
Finally, because there are several aspects of interest regard-
ing both the power of the thread model we consider and our
ability to physically manufacture such dots, we here present
additional evaluations that highlight aspects of the setup.
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Table 2. Fooling performance of the our method on two 1000 frame
videos of a computer keyboard and a stop sign, viewed through a
camera with an adversarial sticker placed on it targeted for these
attacks. The “correct predictions” column indicates how many
times the object is correct classified; the “targeted attack prediction”
indicates how often the target class is predicted (computer mouse
and guitar pick for the two classes respectively); and the third
column indicates how often another class is predicted.
Prediction
Class Correct Targeted Other
Keyboard 271
548
(mouse) 181
Keyboard 320
522
(space bar) 158
Street sign 194
605
(guitar pick) 201
Street sign 222
525
(envelope) 253
Coffee mug 330
427
(candle) 243
Table 3. Number of Dots and Targeted Fooling Rate against
ResNet-50 model on the ImageNet test set
Number of Dots Targeted Fooling Rate
1 27.9%
3 32.0%
5 34.2%
7 38.2%
10 49.6%
Effect of the number of dots Although most of the as-
pects of our dots (besides color and position) are fixed by
fitting them to observed data, one free parameter that we do
have at our disposal is the number of dots we place on the
sticker. Table 3 shows the targeted fooling rate for the com-
puter keyboard to computer mouse attack (here evaluated
in the digital realm on the ImageNet test set), varying the
number of dots. As expected, additional dots increases the
fooling rate, without reaching diminishing returns even at 10
dots. Thus, the limiting factor in the attack is largely related
to how many dots we can physically print while remaining
indistinct; for the physical attacks in the previous section,
for this reason we limited the stickers to 6 dots (which also
highlights that the fooling rate on these real instances is
substantially higher than for the ImageNet test set).
Effect of printed dots on camera perturbations Last,
although these are largely points of discussion, we highlight
some important properties about the effects of the physical
printed dots on the perturbations observed by the camera. It
(a) Background (b) Sticker Pattern (c) r = 0.011 inch
(d) r = 0.015 inch (e) r = 0.02 inch (f) r = 0.025 inch
Figure 8. Resulting effects of a single red dotted stickers with
different radius (the dot is applied to the bottom left corner of the
camera view)
should be noted above that all our physically manufactured
stickers, such as those shown in Figure 3, are (small) solid
opaque dots, which we then place over the camera lens. A
natural question arises as to whether we could create even
smaller dots in the perturbation space by simply printing a
smaller dot. However, this does not work: due to the optics
of the camera, after a certain point a smaller size printed
dot does not result in a smaller size visual dot in the camera,
but rather merely a more transparent dot of the same size.
This process is shown in Figure 8, and also highlights why
we opt to use small solid printed dots to fit our threat model,
rather than allowing for the printed dots to be transparent.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated that it is possible to adver-
sarially fool deep image classifiers in the real world, not
by modifying an object of interest itself, but by modifying
the camera observing the objects. The optics involved with
such modifications greatly limits the types of attacks that
can be physically realized, but by developing a reasonable
threat model and then fitting the parameters of this model
to data, we can accurately capture the allowable set of per-
turbations. By then optimizing over this class to construct
(universal) adversarial examples, we show that it is possible
to perform targeted adversarial attacks on real objects, using
a single adversarial sticker to misclassify an object in multi-
ple different orientations and scales. Overall, this suggests
a new vector of attack against machine learning algorithms
deployed in the real world, highlighting the importance of
adversarial robustness from a practical, security-based point
of view.
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